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LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
                                I. 
         This appeal involves a challenge to the district 
court's asset freeze order arising out of certain litigation 
pending in the district court between members of the Kiesewetter 
family.  The asset freeze order bound Appellant William B. 
Kiesewetter Jr. and his wife, Appellant Jayne H. Kiesewetter 
(collectively, the "Kiesewetters"). 
         We hold that the district court did not err in entering 
the asset freeze order without holding a hearing, and that it 
made adequate factual findings with respect to its freezing of 
William B. Kiesewetter Jr.'s assets.  In addition, we will hold 
that the Freeze Order properly enjoined Jayne Kiesewetter from 
transferring or otherwise disposing of the assets she owned with 
William B. Kiesewetter, Jr. 
         We also hold that the district court properly 
determined that the Appellees, Constance K. Elliott, Patricia J. 
Kiesewetter, Linton A. Elliott, Charles L. Elliott, and Jonathan 
B. Elliott (collectively, the "Beneficiaries"), would suffer 
irreparable harm without the protection of an asset freeze and 
that the hardship to the Kiesewetters did not prevent entry of 
the order.  We will reverse the district court's waiver of the 
Rule 65 bond requirement because it did not make any findings as 
to the Beneficiaries' financial ability (or inability) to post 
the bond.  Finally, we will reject the Kiesewetters' arguments 
that the asset freeze order was too broad and that it violated 
their due process rights. 
                               II. 
         A.   The Parties and the Underlying Litigation 
         The parties to this appeal and the underlying 
litigation are all members of the same family.  The Beneficiaries 
brought two actions against William B. Kiesewetter, Jr.  The 
first action was a demand for an accounting of their family's 
assets and is premised on various claims against Mr. Kiesewetter, 
alleging breach of fiduciary duties, fraud, unjust enrichment and 
violations of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act ("UGMA") 
(hereinafter the "Accounting Action").  A year after filing the 
Accounting Action, the Beneficiaries filed a second lawsuit 
alleging that Mr. Kiesewetter and his second wife, Appellant 
Jayne H. Kiesewetter, fraudulently conveyed Kiesewetter family 
assets from William B. Kiesewetter, Jr.'s name into the joint or 
individual name of Jayne H. Kiesewetter (hereinafter the 
"Fraudulent Conveyance Action") in order to protect the assets 
from a judgment in the Accounting Action. 
         The litigation between the Kiesewetter family members 
began shortly after the death in October 1992 of Grace J. 
Kiesewetter, the wife of the late Dr. William B. Kiesewetter 
("Dr. Kiesewetter").  Dr. Kiesewetter had passed away years 
earlier.  Constance K. Elliott, Patricia K. Elliott and William 
B. Kiesewetter, Jr. are the daughters and son of Dr. and Mrs. 
Kiesewetter.  Linton, Charles and Jonathan Elliott are the sons 
of Appellee Constance Elliott and the only grandchildren of Dr. 
and Mrs. Kiesewetter. 
         The primary dispute between the Kiesewetter family 
members stems from the manner in which certain family assets, 
properties and accounts were handled and managed.  The 
Beneficiaries allege that, prior to their deaths, Dr. and Mrs. 
Kiesewetter placed substantially all of their assets into the 
names of the Beneficiaries and William B. Kiesewetter, Jr. to 
avoid or lessen the estate tax liability upon their respective 
deaths.  William B. Kiesewetter, Jr., a licensed attorney with a 
masters degree in taxation, was Dr. and Mrs. Kiesewetter's 
natural choice as the person to manage these assets.  The 
Beneficiaries allege that Mr. Kiesewetter agreed to manage the 
assets on behalf of himself and the Beneficiaries.  According to 
the Beneficiaries, they discovered after Grace J. Kiesewetter's 
death that Mr. Kiesewetter had acquired their property rights in 
the family assets without their knowledge or consent. 
     In the Accounting Action, the Beneficiaries alleged 
that Mr. Kiesewetter's mismanagement and other fraudulent conduct 
resulted in the dissipation of the family assets that had been 
placed in their names and that Mr. Kiesewetter was liable to them 
for the value of their collective interests in those assets.  The 
Beneficiaries sought an accounting of the family's financial 
affairs and of the UGMA accounts established for Linton A. 
Elliott, Charles L. Elliott and Jonathan B. Elliott.  The 
Beneficiaries demanded over $5 million in compensatory damages 
plus punitive damages and other equitable relief. 
     On December 5, 1994, a jury returned a verdict by 
special interrogatories in the Accounting Action in which it 
determined, inter alia, that Mr. Kiesewetter had breached various 
fiduciary duties that he owed to the Beneficiaries.  Evidence at 
trial revealed that the Beneficiaries had held property interests 
in numerous Kiesewetter family assets.  These assets included 
life insurance proceeds, pension proceeds, property sale 
proceeds, trust funds, bonds, and various bank accounts. 
     At trial, the Beneficiaries established that their 
collective interests in these family assets had a total principal 
value of over $3.4 million.  The evidence established that the 
Beneficiaries' interests in these assets were placed into 
accounts held only in Mr. Kiesewetter's name, and that Mr. 
Kiesewetter reported in excess of $1 million in interest and 
dividend income from these assets.  In addition, the 
Beneficiaries introduced evidence suggesting that they may have 
an interest in other assets Mr. Kiesewetter acquired using a 
portion of their interests in the family assets. 
     On December 30, 1994, Mr. Kiesewetter moved for a new 
trial or alternatively for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  
None of the bases for his motion pertained to the sufficiency of 
the trial evidence regarding the Beneficiaries' interests in the 
family assets or the principal value of those interests.  In 
addition, Mr. Kiesewetter did not challenge the jury's findings 
of liability on the basis that the evidence was insufficient. 
     B.  The Asset Freeze 
     On December 13, 1994, the Beneficiaries moved the 
district court, pursuant to its inherent equitable powers and 
Rule 65, to freeze all of the Kiesewetter family assets held in 
the name of or on behalf of Mr. Kiesewetter, including those 
assets subject to the Fraudulent Conveyance Action.  (A. 91-112).  
In support of their motion, the Beneficiaries relied on facts 
adduced at trial and the jury's verdict.  In the motion, the 
Beneficiaries stated that the purpose of the freeze order was "to 
preserve the assets and properties in the possession, custody or 
control of [Mr. Kiesewetter] that will be necessary to satisfy 
the judgment and other equitable remedies ultimately to be 
entered in [the Accounting Action] in order to make [Appellees] 
whole."  (A. 99).  Attached to the Beneficiaries' motion was a 
proposed asset freeze order, in which the Beneficiaries proposed 
a freeze on all assets held in the name of or on behalf of Mr. 
Kiesewetter, except for monthly payments of up to $2,000 for 
ordinary living expenses, including attorneys' fees.  (A. 95-97). 
     After Mr. Kiesewetter and Jayne H. Kiesewetter filed 
separate responses in opposition to the Beneficiaries' request 
for an asset freeze, the district court held two telephone 
conferences with counsel to discuss the freeze order request.  At 
the first conference, the district court advised counsel that, 
unless Mr. Kiesewetter voluntarily posted a bond in an amount 
sufficient to satisfy a judgment against him in the Accounting 
Action, it would enter an order granting the Beneficiaries' 
freeze order request.  The district court then scheduled a second 
telephone conference, at which Mr. Kiesewetter was to advise the 
court whether he would voluntarily post a bond. 
     Prior to the second conference, the Beneficiaries 
submitted to the district court and all counsel a summary of the 
Beneficiaries' damages for purposes of determining the bond 
amount (S.A. 1-4).  The summary, based upon the evidence at trial 
and the jury's punitive damage award, indicated that the 
Beneficiaries' total damages, with interest and capital 
appreciation, equalled in excess of $6 million.  Neither Mr. 
Kiesewetter nor Jayne H. Kiesewetter submitted any materials to 
the district court prior to the second conference. 
     At the second conference, Mr. Kiesewetter's counsel 
stated that Mr. Kiesewetter was financially unable and personally 
unwilling to post a bond for several million dollars.  The 
district court then ruled that it would impose a freeze on all 
assets held in the name or on behalf of Mr. Kiesewetter for a 
period of 30 days, during which time it would require Mr. 
Kiesewetter to post a bond of $4 million.  The court also ruled 
that, if Mr. Kiesewetter did not file the requisite bond within 
30 days, the asset freeze would remain in effect until final 
disposition of both lawsuits, during which time it would permit 
Mr. Kiesewetter to access funds only for ordinary and reasonable 
living expenses. 
     On February 1, 1995, after considering the 
Beneficiaries' proposed order and Mr. Kiesewetter's objections 
thereto, the district court entered a freeze order against Mr. 
Kiesewetter and Jayne H. Kiesewetter (the "Freeze Order").  The 
Freeze Order enjoined Mr. Kiesewetter and Jayne H. Kiesewetter 
from: 
      . . . withdrawing, transferring, 
     encumbering, disposing of and/or secreting 
     away any monies, stocks, bonds, properties 
     (real or personal) and/or other assets, 
     located anywhere and held or opened in any 
     capacity or name, other than payments for 
     [Mr. Kiesewetter's] ordinary and reasonable 
     basic living expenses not to exceed $2,500 
     per month, without the approval of the Court 
     or of Plaintiffs' counsel. 
(A. 163).  The Freeze Order also prohibited Jayne H. Kiesewetter 
from disposing of her assets without proving to the district 
court that the assets did not derive from Mr. Kiesewetter. 
     On February 3, 1995, Jayne H. Kiesewetter filed an 
emergency motion for relief from the Freeze Order.  In her 
motion, Jayne H. Kiesewetter alleged that she controlled two 
trusts and five bank accounts that provided her at least $13,000 
in monthly income and were independently acquired by her.  Jayne 
H. Kiesewetter sought to have these assets released by the court 
from its Freeze Order.  In response, the district court held a 
telephone conference with counsel regarding the motion.  The 
court then entered an order exempting these particular assets 
from the Freeze Order.  This order, however, contained the 
proviso that Jayne H. Kiesewetter submit, within 21 days, a 
verification of the noncommingling of the independently acquired 
assets and of the existence of the trust agreements.  Jayne H. 
Kiesewetter never filed the verification. 
     Mr. Kiesewetter also filed a motion to modify the 
Freeze Order.  Mr. Kiesewetter sought an increase in the $2,500 
monthly living expense cap to $9,112, as well as permission to 
pay his attorneys' fees out of the frozen funds.  Mr. Kiesewetter 
attached an affidavit to the motion containing a schedule of Mr. 
Kiesewetter's purported "ordinary and reasonable [monthly] 
financial obligations."  According to the schedule, Mr. 
Kiesewetter's monthly living expenses include $1,500 in air 
travel and rental cars, $1,288 in club dues and expenses, $650 in 
groceries and $405 in self storage units.  (A. 190-92).  The 
schedule also lists monthly expenses covering the joint 
obligations of Mr. Kiesewetter and Jayne H. Kiesewetter, 
including items such as $1,978/month in rent for two apartments 
in Pittsburgh (even though Mr. Kiesewetter and Jayne H. 
Kiesewetter are the registered owners of the Kiesewetter family 
home in Pittsburgh), and $1,017/month in lawn care maintenance 
for both their Pittsburgh home and their Florida condominium. 
                               III. 
         The Kiesewetters argue that the district court erred by 
not holding an evidentiary hearing prior to its entry of the 
Freeze Order and by entering the Freeze Order without setting 
forth findings of facts and conclusions of law. 
         A.   Evidentiary Hearing 
         The district court entered the Freeze Order without a 
hearing, determining that: 
         After considering such argument [in the 
         telephone conferences with counsel] as well 
         as the evidence presented at trial and by 
         motion or response and the jury's December 5, 
         1994 verdict, the Court finds that an 
         accounting is required in order to determine 
         Plaintiffs' damages, that Plaintiffs are 
         likely to become entitled to the encumbered 
         funds upon the completion of the accounting, 
         that Plaintiffs' damages are expected to be 
         at least $4 million, and that Plaintiffs will 
         suffer immediate and irreparable harm if no 
         order is issued. 
(A. 157).  In making its findings, the district court determined 
that there were enough facts in the record to support its 
conclusions and that an evidentiary hearing was unwarranted.  We 
review the district court's decision to issue the Freeze Order 
without holding an evidentiary hearing only for an abuse of 
discretion.  Acierno v. New Castle County, 40 F.3d 645, 652 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
         In determining whether the district court should have 
held an evidentiary hearing, we must focus on whether there were 
any issues of fact in dispute with respect to the Freeze Order.  
A district court cannot issue a preliminary injunction that 
depends upon the resolution of disputed issues of fact unless the 
court first holds an evidentiary hearing.  Professional Plan 
Examiners of New Jersey, Inc. v. Lefante, 750 F.2d 282, 288 (3d 
Cir. 1984).  We have recognized, however, that "a decision [to 
enter an order] may be based on affidavits and other documentary 
evidence if the facts are undisputed and the relevant factual 
issues are resolved."  Bradley v. Pittsburgh Board of Education, 
910 F.2d 1172, 1175-76 (3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). 
         The Kiesewetters argue that in order to resolve the 
Beneficiaries' request for the asset freeze, the district court 
was forced to "resolve disputed issues of fact which directly 
impacted upon the fundamental inquiry of whether Plaintiff- 
Appellees will suffer irreparable harm if no injunction is 
issued."  Appellants' Br. 18.  The Kiesewetters identified the 
following "factual issues" as being in dispute:  (1) whether Mr. 
Kiesewetter was likely to improperly dissipate or conceal the 
assets that remained in his name; (2) whether Jayne H. 
Kiesewetter was likely to assist Mr. Kiesewetter in dissipating 
the assets; (3) whether the Beneficiaries are likely to recover a 
judgment in an amount that exceeds Mr. Kiesewetter's net worth.  
Id. at 18-19. 
         In refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing, the 
district court impliedly resolved the above "factual issues" 
against the Kiesewetters.  The Kiesewetters offer little to 
suggest that to do so was an abuse of discretion.  In addition, 
close examination reveals that the Kiesewetters' "factual issues" 
were either not in dispute given the facts in the record, or were 
not relevant to the district court's entry of the Freeze Order. 
         Prior to the district court's entry of the Freeze 
Order, the jury determined that the Beneficiaries were entitled 
to their share of the family assets and that Mr. Kiesewetter was 
liable for the dissipation of those assets.  In addition, the 
jury determined that Mr. Kiesewetter had fraudulently obtained 
the Beneficiaries' interest in the family assets, that he had 
unjustly enriched himself at the Beneficiaries' expense and that 
his conduct was sufficiently outrageous to warrant the imposition 
of $500,000 in punitive damages.  Thus, the Kiesewetters' first 
"factual issue" was not improperly ignored by the district court.  
It was hardly an abuse of discretion for the district court to 
conclude, based on Mr. Kiesewetter's prior course of conduct with 
respect to the family assets, that he was likely to dissipate the 
remaining assets if he was not restrained from doing so. 
         The second factual issue raised by the Kiesewetters, 
whether Jayne H. Kiesewetter was likely to assist Mr. Kiesewetter 
in dissipating the assets, is in dispute but does not preclude 
entry of the Freeze Order.  The existence of this factual issue 
does not mandate a finding that the district court could not have 
entered, without a hearing, a freeze order enjoining Mr. 
Kiesewetter.  There are facts in the record that indicate that 
there is a strong likelihood that Mr. Kiesewetter will, if he is 
not enjoined, transfer additional assets to Jayne H. Kiesewetter 
to avoid payment of a judgment in the Accounting Action.  In the 
Fraudulent Conveyance Action, Mr. Kiesewetter admitted that he 
had transferred most, if not all, of the fraudulently obtained 
family assets to joint ownership with Jayne H. Kiesewetter.  (A. 
75-76).  Further, in response to the Beneficiaries' motion for an 
asset freeze, Mr. Kiesewetter acknowledged that he was aware 
that, in Pennsylvania, his conveyance of the family assets to 
joint ownership with his wife, Jayne H. Kiesewetter, caused the 
assets to become tenants by entireties property.  (A. 126).  Mr. 
Kiesewetter was also aware that tenants by entireties property is 
protected under Pennsylvania law from any judgment which might be 
rendered against an individual spouse. (A. 126). 
         The third factual issue that the Kiesewetters claim the 
district court resolved against them was never in fact resolved 
by the district court in its entry of the Freeze Order.  The 
district court's entry of the Freeze Order was not based on an 
evaluation of Mr. Kiesewetter's net worth.  Mr. Kiesewetter 
refused to post the $4 million bond, perhaps leading the court to 
consider whether he would ultimately be able to satisfy a multi- 
million dollar judgment.  A district court is clearly permitted 
to consider the likelihood that a defendant will be able to pay a 
judgment in determining whether to enter an asset freeze order.  
See Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 F.2d 186, 205 
(3d Cir. 1990).  Further, the Freeze Order was entered to 
preserve what remained of the family assets.  The evidence at 
trial revealed that the total principal value of the family 
assets to which the Beneficiaries had an interest equalled over 
$3.4 million.  Adding the jury's punitive damages award and a 
potential interest award, the district court set the $4 million 
bond amount, reasonably approximating the amount of the judgment 
that would ultimately be entered against Mr. Kiesewetter.  The 
court made no finding with respect to whether this amount 
exceeded Mr. Kiesewetter's net worth. 
         As such, we conclude that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing 
prior to its entry of the Freeze Order enjoining Mr. Kiesewetter. 
         B.   Factual Findings -- Rule 52(a) 
         Rule 52(a) provides that "in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall . . . set forth the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute grounds 
of its actions."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).  The Supreme Court has 
recognized the importance of requiring district courts to comply 
with Rule 52(a), stating that: 
         It is of the highest importance to a proper 
         review of the action of a court in granting 
         or refusing a preliminary injunction that 
         there should be fair compliance with Rule 
         52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.  . . . 
         [I]f appellants conceived themselves 
         aggrieved by the action of the court upon 
         motion for preliminary injunction, they were 
         entitled to have explicit findings of fact 
         upon which the conclusion of the court was 
         based.  Such findings are obviously necessary 
         to the intelligent and orderly presentation 
         and proper disposition of an appeal. 
Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., Inc., 309 U.S. 310, 316- 
317 (1940).  We have recognized the continuing import of the 
Court's fact finding requirements in Mayo.  Bradley, 910 F.2d at 
1178.  We have held that a district court's order must be vacated 
if its findings "are inadequate to explain the basis for [its] 
ruling or to permit meaningful review" of its ruling.  
Professional Plan Examiners, 750 F.2d at 289. 
         The Kiesewetters argue that "Rule 52(a) has been 
flaunted" because the district court did not make adequate 
factual findings supporting its Freeze Order.  Reply Br. 13.  In 
entering the Freeze Order, the district court found that:  (1) An 
accounting was required in order to determine the Beneficiaries' 
compensatory damages; (2) the Beneficiaries were likely to become 
entitled to the encumbered funds upon completion of the 
accounting; (3) the Beneficiaries' damages were expected to be at 
least $4 million; and (4) the Beneficiaries would suffer 
immediate and irreparable harm if no order was issued.  (A. 157).  
The district court indicated that these findings were based upon 
the evidence presented both at trial and by motion or response, 
as well as on the jury's verdict. 
         The Kiesewetters have not identified what particular 
factual findings were not made by the district court, nor have 
they challenged the propriety of the district court's findings.  
Instead, they assert in conclusory fashion that "the District 
Court did not state its findings of fact in this case."  
Appellants' Br. 20.  We construe this argument as an argument 
that the factual findings made by the district court failed to 
satisfy the requirements of Rule 52(a). 
         In determining whether a district court has made 
adequate findings supporting the issuance of an injunction, we 
have "looked to see whether the record provides a sufficient 
basis to ascertain the legal and factual grounds for the grant or 
denial of the injunction."  Bradley, 910 F.2d at 1178-79.  In 
cases in which a jury has issued a verdict, the jury's resolution 
of factual and legal issues in reaching the verdict can properly 
serve as a basis for the district court's issuance of an 
injunction.  See, e.g., Educational Testing Services v. Katzman, 
793 F.2d 533, 546 (3d Cir. 1986); Danny Kresky Enterprises Corp. 
v. Magid, 716 F.2d 206, 214-15 (3d Cir. 1983). 
         In this case, the district court's factual findings 
were sufficient to support the entry of the Freeze Order.  The 
district court entered the Freeze Order only after the jury found 
that the Beneficiaries had a legitimate interest in the 
Kiesewetter family assets and that Mr. Kiesewetter, in acquiring 
the Beneficiaries' interests in the assets, had breached his 
fiduciary duties, committed fraud, and unjustly enriched himself.  
Thus, the factual findings underlying the jury's verdict were 
properly used by the district court to support its entry of the 
Freeze Order.  The facts supporting the jury's verdict, along 
with the facts found by the district court, clearly provide the 
legal and factual basis for the district court's issuance of the 
injunction and, as such, satisfied the requirements of 
Rule 52(a). 
         Accordingly, we reject the Kiesewetters' argument that 
the district court abused its discretion by not making adequate 
factual findings in support of its issuance of the Freeze Order. 
                               IV. 
         The district court's Freeze Order was directed in part 
at Jayne H. Kiesewetter, providing that: 
         This freeze order does not affect any 
         accounts that involve monies, properties or 
         other assets that belong to Jayne H. 
         Kiesewetter which she acquired independently 
         from Mr. Kiesewetter.  However, during the 
         period of this freeze order, Jayne H. 
         Kiesewetter shall not be permitted to make 
         any withdrawals, transfers, encumbrances or 
         other dispositions of such independently- 
         acquired assets until she files with the 
         Court and serves on Plaintiffs' counsel an 
         accounting of such assets, which shall 
         include the location, identity and 
         origin/source of such asset. 
Dist. Ct. Order. 3 (emphasis added). 
         The Kiesewetters argue that the district court erred in 
not making any findings with respect to the Beneficiaries' 
likelihood of success on the merits against Jayne H. Kiesewetter 
in the Fraudulent Conveyance Action or the Accounting Action.  
The Beneficiaries suggest that, because both Mr. Kiesewetter and 
Jayne H. Kiesewetter admitted that Mr. Kiesewetter transferred 
some of the family assets from Mr. Kiesewetter's ownership to 
Jayne H. Kiesewetter's ownership, Jayne H. Kiesewetter will 
ultimately be liable to the Beneficiaries. 
     In entering the Freeze Order, the district court 
concluded that "[p]laintiffs are likely to become entitled to the 
encumbered funds upon completion of the accounting, that 
Plaintiffs damages are expected to be at least $4 million, and 
that Plaintiffs will suffer immediate and irreparable harm if no 
order is issued."  (A. 157).  The "encumbered funds" that the 
district court referred to included assets that were jointly held 
in the names of William B. Kiesewetter and Jayne H. Kiesewetter.  
Thus, implicit in the district court's conclusion that the 
Plaintiffs will become entitled to the encumbered funds is a 
finding that the Beneficiaries will likely succeed on the merits 
in the Fraudulent Conveyance Action. 
     We conclude that the district court's finding is 
warranted.  Under Pennsylvania law, "[w]hen a creditor 
establishes that a grantor was in debt at the time of the 
conveyance, the burden shifts to the grantees to establish by 
clear and convincing evidence, either that the grantor was then 
solvent and not rendered insolvent by the conveyance, or that he 
received fair consideration for the conveyance."  Coscia v. 
Hendrie, 629 A.2d 1024, 1026 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citation 
omitted); see also Stinner v. Stinner, 446 A.2d 651 (Pa. Super. 
1982); United States v. Purcell, 798 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Pa. 
1991), aff'd, 972 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1992) (Table).  As 
Plaintiffs point out, they established that William B. 
Kiesewetter unlawfully obtained the family assets, and he and 
Jayne H. Kiesewetter admit that William transferred most of these 
assets held in his sole name to his joint name with Jayne.  There 
is ample evidence from which the district court could have found 
that William was in debt to plaintiffs at the time of the 
transfers.  The burden of establishing otherwise, or of showing 
that the conveyances were supported by consideration, then 
shifted to Jayne.  Jayne H. Kiesewetter offered no evidence as to 
William's continued solvency, and she presented no evidence to 
the district court suggesting that William's transfer of the 
family assets to her was supported by any consideration.  
Indeed, plaintiffs presented evidence during the trial in the 
accounting action that William's movement of the family's assets 
into his joint name with Jayne occurred after or about the time 
when plaintiffs had employed counsel to investigate his 
activities, and that William had a meeting with plaintiffs where 
he failed to reveal to them the true nature of his conduct.  SeeApp. 107.  
For these reasons, we will not disturb the district 
court's finding that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the 
merits of the fraudulent conveyance action. 
                                V. 
     The Kiesewetters next argue that we should vacate the 
Freeze Order because the district court erred in finding that the 
Beneficiaries would suffer irreparable harm absent the Freeze 
Order and in not balancing the harm to be suffered by the 
Kiesewetters as a result of the Freeze Order. 
     A.  Irreparable Harm 
     In Hoxworth, we recognized that a district court had 
the equitable power in certain situations to protect a future 
damages remedy.  903 F.2d at 197.  We noted, however that this 
power is far from unlimited.  Specifically, we stated that: 
     Of course, just because a district court 
     enjoys the power to protect a potential 
     future damages remedy with a preliminary 
     injunction does not mean that such an 
     injunction is appropriate in a run-of-the- 
     mill damages action.  The traditional 
     requirements for obtaining equitable relief 
     must be met.  These include, in this context, 
     a showing that plaintiffs are likely to 
     become entitled to the encumbered funds upon 
     final judgment and a showing that without the 
     preliminary injunction, plaintiffs will 
     probably be unable to recover those funds. 
Id. 
     The Kiesewetters focus on the second Hoxworthrequirement, which is 
essentially an irreparable harm inquiry 
(i.e., if plaintiffs cannot recover the funds absent the 
injunction, they will suffer irreparable harm), arguing that "the 
irreparable harm element is established by a showing that, in the 
absence of an injunction, the party being enjoined is likely to 
wrongfully dissipate or conceal his [or her] assets."  
Appellants' Br. 25.  The Beneficiaries counter by arguing that in 
Hoxworth, we determined that irreparable injury exists if a 
judgment will probably go unsatisfied absent an injunction.  
Appellees' Br. 37. 
     We need not rule, in this context, on the parties' 
arguments regarding Hoxworth to affirm the district court's entry 
of the Freeze Order in this case.  That irreparable harm would 
occur absent an asset freeze is even more apparent where the very 
assets subject to a potential judgment will likely be dissipated 
without entry of the order.  Thus, consistent with Hoxworth, we 
hold that a court may find that a party seeking an asset freeze 
to preserve a money judgment may show irreparable injury by 
showing that the freeze is necessary to prevent the consumption, 
dissipation or fraudulent conveyance of the assets that the party 
pursuing the asset freeze seeks to recover in the underlying 
litigation.  The fact that the assets subject to the Freeze 
Order are primarily money assets does not preclude entry of a 
freeze order enjoining the use of those assets. 
     In fact, the money assets subject to the Freeze Order 
will likely provide the Beneficiaries relief which is equitable 
in nature.  The equitable nature of the Beneficiaries' desired 
relief offers an additional compelling justification for 
affirming the district court's entry of the Freeze Order.  The 
Beneficiaries seek to have returned to them property interests in 
assets that the jury determined were given to them but never 
received due to Mr. Kiesewetter's unlawful conduct.  Mr. 
Kiesewetter admitted at trial that his sole source of income 
since 1983 has derived from his "management" of the family 
assets.  Thus, the only way that the Beneficiaries will be able 
to be made whole is by recovering what is left of the family 
assets and preventing Mr. Kiesewetter from further dissipating 
the assets.  Given Mr. Kiesewetter's history of fraud with 
respect to the family assets, it was not clear error for the 
district court to conclude that the Beneficiaries would likely 
suffer irreparable harm, as a result of Mr. Kiesewetter's further 
dissipation of the assets, without the Freeze Order. 
     We emphasize that this is an extraordinary case that 
demanded extraordinary measures by the district court to preserve 
what was left of the family assets.  Given that a jury had 
already concluded that Mr. Kiesewetter has unconscionably lied to 
and stolen from his family members, the district court properly 
entered the Freeze Order against Mr. Kiesewetter and has properly 
placed a limit on the amount that Mr. Kiesewetter can spend on 
"ordinary and reasonable basic living expenses" during the course 
of the litigation. 
     B.  Balancing of Hardships 
     The Kiesewetters argue that the district court erred in 
not balancing the hardships to the respective parties before 
entering the Freeze Order.  In Hoxworth, we held that "[o]f 
course a preliminary injunction causing serious injury to 
defendants can be justified if it inflicts no more harm than 
reasonably necessary to prevent plaintiffs who are likely to 
prevail on the merits from suffering an irreparable injury."  903 
F.2d at 207. 
     The Kiesewetters claim that Mr. Kiesewetter "is 
suffering tremendous hardship" because he is "unable to meet his 
monthly obligations or pay his attorneys . . . ."  Appellants' 
Br. 28.  These obligations are detailed in his motion to increase 
his monthly allowance, which is currently before the district 
court.  As we noted earlier, these obligations include $1,500 per 
month in air travel and rental car expenses, $1,300 per month in 
club dues and expenses, $405 in self-storage unit rental costs, 
and approximately $1,000 in lawn care and maintenance expenses 
for two residences in Pittsburgh and Florida.  In addition, Mr. 
Kiesewetter's obligations include rent payments on two apartments 
in Pittsburgh approximating $2,000, despite the fact that he and 
Jayne H. Kiesewetter are the registered owners of a home in 
Pittsburgh.  Finally, the Kiesewetters, in their hardship 
discussion, fail to mention that Jayne H. Kiesewetter (Mr. 
Kiesewetter's wife) receives at least $13,000 a month from assets 
not effected by the Freeze Order. 
     We cannot conclude that the Freeze Order, which may 
prevent Mr. Kiesewetter from covering the above living expenses, 
constitutes a hardship that outweighs the potential harm faced by 
the Beneficiaries, who have already lost a considerable portion 
of their collective interests in the family assets due to Mr. 
Kiesewetter's blatant fraud.  The inability to spend over $6,000 
a month on primarily luxury expenses does not strike us as a 
hardship.  We are, however, unwilling to conduct our own analysis 
of whether Mr. Kiesewetter's claim that he is harmed by not being 
able to meet his monthly obligations is valid.  The district 
court presumably is conducting such an analysis in its 
consideration of Mr. Kiesewetter's motion to increase his monthly 
amount.  As such, we will not vacate the Freeze Order on the 
grounds that the district court failed to balance the hardship to 
the parties involved. 
 
                               VI. 
     The district court, in its Freeze Order, waived the 
requirement that the Beneficiaries post a security bond.  
Specifically, the court held: 
     The posting of security pursuant to 
     Fed.R.Civ.Proc. No. 65(c) is hereby waived in 
     light of the equitable and substantial nature 
     of Plaintiffs' claims against Mr. 
     Kiesewetter, the jury's December 5, 1994 
     verdict finding against him with respect to 
     all such claims, and the lack of proof by Mr. 
     Kiesewetter as to any hardship on him as a 
     result of this freeze order. 
Dist. Ct. Order 5. 
     The Kiesewetters argue that, because of the financial 
harm that Mr. Kiesewetter suffered as a result of the Freeze 
Order, the district court's waiver of the requirement that the 
Beneficiaries post a security bond was error.  Rule 65(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part that: 
     (c)  Security.  No restraining order or 
     preliminary injunction shall issue except 
     upon the giving of security by the applicant, 
     in such sum as the court deems proper, for 
     the payment of such costs and damages as may 
     incurred or suffered by any party who is 
     found to have been wrongfully enjoined or 
     restrained. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 
     We have strictly interpreted the bond requirement of 
Rule 65(c) and have recognized that such a bond "provides a fund 
to use to compensate incorrectly enjoined defendants."  Hoxworth, 
903 F.2d at 210 (quoting Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air 
Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 805-06 n.9 (3d Cir. 1989)).  In 
Hoxworth, we noted that, "[w]hile there are exceptions, the 
instances in which a bond may not be required are so rare that 
the requirement is almost mandatory."  Id. 
     Notwithstanding our strict reading of Rule 65(c), we 
have indicated that there may be instances in which a strict 
reading of the rule is not appropriate.  In Temple University v. 
White, we explicitly recognized an exception to the Rule 65(c) 
bond requirement.  941 F.2d 201, 219 (3d Cir. 1991).  Relying on 
an approach articulated by the First Circuit, in Temple 
University we determined that, "at least in noncommercial cases, 
the court should consider the possible loss to the enjoined party 
together with the hardship that a bond requirement would impose 
on the applicant."  Id. (quoting Crowley v. Local No. 82, 
Furniture & Piano, 679 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1982)).  Thus, the 
Temple University exception involves a balance of the equities of 
the potential hardships that each party would suffer as a result 
of a preliminary injunction.  Where the balance of these equities 
weighs overwhelmingly in favor of the party seeking the 
injunction, a district court has the discretion to waive the Rule 
65(c) bond requirement. 
     In this case, the district court made no findings 
regarding the Beneficiaries' financial ability to post the bond.  
The district court based its waiver on "the equitable and 
substantial nature of Plaintiffs' claims against Mr. Kiesewetter, 
the jury's December 5, 1994 verdict finding against him with 
respect to all such claims, and the lack of proof by Mr. 
Kiesewetter as to any hardship on him as a result of this freeze 
order."  The district court's failure to make findings regarding 
Beneficiaries' potential financial hardship suggests that it did 
not adequately perform the balancing of equities required to find 
a Temple University exception to the Rule 65(c) bond requirement. 
     Thus, we will reverse the district court's waiver of 
the security bond and remand the case so that the district court 
can determine whether a balance of the potential hardships to 
both parties weighs in favor of the Beneficiaries.  See Temple 
University, 941 F.2d at 220 n.28 (concluding that the proper 
remedy of a district court error in waiving the Rule 65(c) bond 
requirement necessitates a remand for reconsideration). 
     In so holding, we make no judgment as to whether the 
actual waiver was appropriate.  We reverse only on the basis that 
the district court failed to make findings regarding the 
financial hardships that a bond requirement would impose upon the 
Beneficiaries.  We have consistently determined that strict 
adherence to the requirements of Rule 65(c) is necessary to 
combat rash, baseless applications for preliminary injunctions.  
As such, we must ensure that the exception we have set forth in 
Temple University remains a narrow exception.  Because departure 
from the bond requirement is rare, we hold that a district court 
must make specific findings, in granting a Temple Universityexception, 
regarding the relative hardships to each party. 
                               VII. 
     The Kiesewetters restate their arguments with regard to 
the district court's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing prior 
to entry of the Freeze Order and argue that the refusal amounted 
to an unconstitutional denial of their due process rights.  The 
Kiesewetters remind us that "[f]undamental concepts of due 
process require that a person may not be deprived of his property 
without first being afforded the opportunity to be heard."  
Appellants' Br. 32, citing Simmerman v. Corino, 27 F.2d 58, 64 
(3d Cir. 1994).  The Kiesewetters suggest that they were not 
permitted to address several significant factual issues prior to 
issuance of the injunction. 
     An individual's due process right to an opportunity to 
be heard does not ensure a hearing in all contexts.  To so 
require would grind judicial and administrative gears to a 
screeching halt.  Thus, an individual's due process right to an 
opportunity to be heard can be preserved by courts or 
administrative bodies in many different ways.  The constitutional 
requirements of due process are not technical, nor is any 
particular form of procedure always necessary to provide due 
process.  Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 609 (1974). 
     We are convinced that the Kiesewetters had several 
opportunities to be heard, and as such did not suffer a denial of 
their due process rights.  The Kiesewetters had many 
opportunities to respond both in writing and orally to the 
district court before its entry of the Freeze Order.  In fact, 
both William B. Kiesewetter, Jr. and Jayne H. Kiesewetter 
submitted written responses after the Beneficiaries filed their 
request for an asset freeze.  In addition, the Kiesewetters' 
counsel were present during the conferences held on January 20 
and 25, 1995, and both parties had the opportunity to file 
objections to the proposed orders prior to the district court's 
final entry of the Freeze Order.  Finally, both Mr. Kiesewetter 
and Jayne H. Kiesewetter have filed requests to modify the Freeze 
Order.  In fact, Jayne H. Kiesewetter has already requested and 
received relief, based on her due process rights, from the 
district court with respect to assets that she independently 
acquired.  (A. 170). 
     Clearly, the Kiesewetters had ample opportunity to 
challenge the district court's entry of the Freeze Order.  As 
such, we reject the Kiesewetters' argument that the district 
court deprived them of their due process rights. 
     Finally, the Kiesewetters argue that the relief 
provided by the Freeze Order "goes well beyond the proper purpose 
of preserving the status quo."  Appellants' Br. 34.  We have 
recognized that an injunction should be designed to preserve the 
status quo and should not be punitive in nature.  CFTC v. 
American Metals Exchange Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 79 (3d Cir. 1993). 
     The Freeze Order in this case does no more than 
preserve the Kiesewetter family assets from further dissipation 
by the Kiesewetters.  It merely attempts to ensure that the 
Beneficiaries receive some legal and equitable relief once the 
accounting is completed.  This is precisely what an asset freeze 
should accomplish.  Id. at 79.  As stated before, because Mr. 
Kiesewetter has a motion pending before the district court with 
respect to whether the $2,500 limit on his monthly spending 
should be increased, we need not address in this appeal the 
Kiesewetters' argument that the Freeze Order's restriction on Mr. 
Kiesewetter's ability to meet his financial obligations 
impermissibly amounts to punishment, rather than preservation of 
the status quo.  We find that the district court's Freeze Order, 
including the $2,500 spending limit, did nothing more than 
attempt to preserve the status quo and was supported by facts in 
the record. 
                              VIII. 
     We hold that the district court properly concluded that 
the Beneficiaries would suffer irreparable harm without the 
protection of the Freeze Order and that the potential hardship to 
the Kiesewetters did not preclude entry of the order.  
Accordingly, we will affirm district court's entry of the Freeze 
Order.  Finally, we hold that the district court's waiver of the 
Rule 65 bond requirement was error because it did not make 
findings as to the Beneficiaries' financial ability (or 
inability) to post the bond.  We will thus reverse the district 
court's order in this regard and remand for reconsideration. 
_________________________ 
 
 
               
